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RESTORING INDEPENDENCE TO THE GRAND
JURY: A VICTIM ADVOCATE FOR POLICE USE OF
FORCE CASES
JONATHAN WITMER-RICH*
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a grand jury victim advocate to represent the interests of
the complainant before the grand jury in investigations into police use of excessive
force. Currently, the prosecutor has near-exclusive access to the grand jury, and as a
result, grand juries have become almost entirely dependent on prosecutors.
Historically, however, grand juries exhibited much greater independence. In
particular, grand juries have a long history in America of providing oversight over
government officials, bringing criminal charges for official misconduct even when
local prosecutors proved reluctant. Permitting the alleged victim of police excessive
force to be represented before the grand jury would ensure that the grand jury hears
from a representative whose interests are truly aligned with the complainant rather
than the police. This addition would give the grand jurors an ability to rediscover
and reclaim the tradition of independence, and to provide democratic oversight over
cases of alleged police misconduct.
This Article will address the role of the prosecutor and the grand jury in police
use of deadly force cases with a view toward American jurisdictions generally, but
with a particular focus on Ohio law and recent events in Cleveland, most notably the
grand jury proceeding following the shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice on
November 22, 2014.
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I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Prosecutor’s Conflict of Interest
In the past few years, a growing chorus of commentators has criticized the role of
prosecutors and grand juries in police use of deadly force cases—such as the
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; the shooting of Tamir Rice in
Cleveland, Ohio; and the choking death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York. 1
Critics charge that prosecutors face an inherent conflict of interest when
investigating potential excessive force cases against police officers, given that
prosecutors work closely with police officers and depend on police cooperation for
their own success.2 This places pressure on prosecutors not to alienate local police
by pursuing criminal charges against individual officers. 3
1 See, e.g., Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745 (2016)
[hereinafter Levine, How We Prosecute the Police]; Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How
to Make a Police Shooting Disappear, GQ (July 14, 2016), http://www.gq.com/story/tamirrice-story; Matt Taibbi, A Year Later, the Eric Garner Grand Jury Decision Still Stings,
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/a-year-later-theeric-garner-grand-jury-decision-still-stings-20151203; Paul Butler, The System Must
Counteract Prosecutors’ Natural Sympathies for Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-aspecial-prosecutor/the-system-must-counteract-prosecutors-natural-sympathies-for-cops; see
also infra notes 2, 5.
2

Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1447
(2016) (arguing that “conflict of interest between local prosecutors and police-defendants is so
anathema to our system of justice that it requires removal in every case where an officer is
accused of committing a crime”) [hereinafter Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police];
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest and Excessive Use of
Force by Police, CRIM. JUST. 47 (2015) (“Concern about prosecutorial conflict of interest in
handling allegations of excessive force by police is widespread.”); Paul Butler & Monroe
Freedman, Ferguson Prosecutor Should Have Bowed Out, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 8, 2014)
(“[T]here’s an unethical conflict of interest when a prosecutor participates in the indictment of
a police officer in his or her own jurisdiction, because the prosecutor has a personal and
professional need to maintain good relations with the police, who have been known to threaten
not to cooperate with a prosecutor if a fellow officer is indicted.”); Paul Cassell, Who
Prosecutes the Police? Perceptions of Bias in Police Misconduct Investigations and a
Possible
Remedy,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
5,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/05/who-prosecutesthe-police-perceptions-of-bias-in-police-misconduct-investigations-and-a-possibleremedy/?utm_term=.b2ebdcc25855 (“While it is not necessarily an inherent conflict of
interest for a local prosecuting attorney to conduct an investigation into allegations of
misconduct by police agencies that he works with regularly, it can create the perception of
bias. . . . A district attorney’s office that is one day calling a police officer to the stand as a
critical witness may have a difficult time the next day investigating that same officer and
charging him with a crime.”); Brian Beutler, The NYC Cop Who Strangled Eric Garner to
Death Is Free Thanks to a Legal Flaw. Here's How Voters Can Fix It, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 3,
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In addition, prosecutors are accustomed to giving credibility to claims by
investigating police officers as against conflicting claims by suspects.4 As a result,
prosecutors may adopt a presumption in favor of the police unless clear evidence
contradicts the police narrative and supports the victim’s account. Police officer
organizations’ endorsements often play a critical role in elections of local
prosecutors.5 All of these forces, critics claim, make prosecutors unlikely to
investigate and pursue possible criminal charges against police officers with
objectivity.6 These criticisms have become part of a high-profile public debate in
recent years, although similar criticisms have been levied for decades.7
2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120478/eric-garner-police-officer-shouldve-beeninvestigated-independently.
3 Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, supra note 2, at 1469-70; Joy &
McMunigal, supra note 2, at 48; Butler & Freedman, supra note 2; Cassell, supra note 2;
Beutler, supra note 2.
4

Louis B. Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the Community
Rights Division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 102429 (1970).
5 Kami Chavis Simmons, Ferguson and Beyond: Increasing Police Accountability:
Restoring Trust and Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 137, 145 (2015) (“[M]ore than 80 percent of local prosecutors are
elected, and they not only work closely with police to investigate and punish crimes, but also
often depend on police union endorsements to win and keep their jobs. Thus local prosecutors
are heavily influenced not to make decisions that would anger those unions.”) [hereinafter
Simmons, Ferguson and Beyond]; Editorial Board, Reform Prosecuting Police Misconduct:
Our
View,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
10,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/12/10/eric-garner-staten-island-police-districtattorney-editorials-debates/20216333/; Beutler, supra note 2 (discussing the need to “to
eliminate the conflict of interest that arises—as it did in Ferguson and Staten Island—when
local prosecutors investigate the officers on whom they rely for evidence, cooperation, and
political endorsements.”).
6 Simmons, Ferguson and Beyond, supra note 5; Editorial Board, supra note 5; Beutler,
supra note 2.
7

See, e.g., LOUIS STOKES AND DAVID CHANOFF, THE GENTLEMAN FROM OHIO 68-71
(Trillium ed., 1st ed. 2016) (discussing police use of deadly force cases in Cleveland from the
late 1950s and early 1960s in which grand juries declined to indict notwithstanding evidence
of excessive force); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“[P]rosecutors often enjoy too close of a relationship with
local police and are therefore reluctant to turn against those with whom they have worked.”);
John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 803-804 (2000)
(“Prosecutors also find themselves in a difficult position when faced with an accusation of
police misconduct. They work closely with police, and their ability to succeed in their
everyday tasks of prosecuting routine crimes depends on the work and cooperation of police
officers.”); Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just
Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 719 (1996); Peter Davis, Rodney King
and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct and Juridical Access to the
Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of Police Brutality when the Prosecutor Declines to
Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 272 (1994) (“[T]he close working relationship between the
police and prosecutors continues to make it extremely unlikely that many prosecutors will
ever mount a credible challenge to systemic police brutality”); Schwartz, supra note 4.
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Commentators have long observed that prosecutors are very unlikely to pursue
criminal charges against police officers—their day-to-day colleagues and allies—for
use of excessive force.8 And in fact, such prosecutions have historically been rare. 9
B. Cases are Handled Differently When Police are the Suspects
There is also evidence that in the rare instances in which prosecutors do present
to grand juries cases involving police use of force, they do so in a way that is
markedly different from most other case presentations to grand juries. 10
In most ordinary criminal cases not involving police officers as suspects, grand
jury presentations are brief and cursory affairs, aimed only at passing over the
relatively low bar of probable cause. 11 Few live witnesses are called, and often the
entire presentation consists of hearsay testimony from one officer who was not
involved in the investigation. 12 Not all jurisdictions impose a duty on prosecutors to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 13 There is no clear authority in most
jurisdictions requiring prosecutors to explain potential defenses. 14 The more
8

Jacobi, supra note 7, at 804; Freeman, supra note 7, at 719.

9

Linda Sheryl Greene, Ferguson and Beyond: Before and After Michael Brown—
Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 36 (2015)
(“[W]hen police use deadly force . . . prosecutions are rare and the circumstances rarely lead
to conviction”); Jacobi, supra note 7, at 803; Freeman, supra note 7, at 726 (“[C]onvictions of
police officers for brutality are relatively infrequent. Department of Justice statistics on
Criminal Section activities from 1985 to 1994 reflect a lower success rate in its civil rights law
enforcement cases than in its general civil rights docket.”).
10 Freeman, supra note 7, at 703 (noting that “[p]olice brutality is treated differently from
other crimes”). Freeman states, “Police crimes are underreported, underinvestigated,
underprosecuted and underconvicted. If a case clears these hurdles and is successfully
prosecuted, the chances are that it will be undersentenced relative to crimes not involving
police brutality.” Id.
11 Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the
Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2002) (“Presentations are brief and
perfunctory, usually consisting of little more than a single government agent reading enough
of the case file to the grand jury to establish probable cause.”) [hereinafter Simmons, ReExamining].
12

See id.

13 See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 2:32, at n.5 (2d ed. 2016)
(“Although a prosecutor is required to instruct the grand jury on applicable legal principles,
see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.25(6), it is unclear whether and to what extent the prosecutor
must submit to the grand jury legal instructions relating to possible defenses suggested by the
evidence.”); SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:17 (2d ed. 2015)
(“In approximately a quarter of the states, there are statutes or judicial decisions that require
prosecutors to inform the grand jury of exculpatory evidence in some circumstances.
Additionally, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards propose a similar
obligation. The United States Supreme Court, in contrast, has held that federal prosecutors
have no such duty.”).
14 SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 9:10 (stating that in New York, the prosecutor
must “advise the grand jury on the nature and effect of complete defenses such as self-defense
where the evidence supports such a defense,” but noting that “New York is the only state in
which the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s instructions has been litigated extensively”).
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elaborate and detailed evidence is saved for the trial and not presented to the grand
jury.
In contrast, in several recent high-profile cases, such as the deaths of Michael
Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice, prosecutors have conducted what appeared to
be an extensive full-blown “trial” before the grand jury. 15 Prosecutors have called all
potentially relevant fact witnesses to testify in person, commissioned multiple expert
reports and called expert witnesses, staged and presented elaborate reconstructions,
introduced voluminous documentary evidence, and focused extensively on possible
defenses.16 In some cases, prosecutors even took the extremely unusual step of
allowing the suspect-officers to testify before the grand jury without being subject to
cross-examination.17
C. Reform Proposals
Commentators have suggested many possible reforms to the prosecutorial
function and/or grand jury process that might ameliorate these inherent conflicts of
interest and make the grand jury process more fair and neutral.

15 See Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, supra note 1, at 745 (examining the
“seemingly special precharge and preindictment procedure that police receive”).
16

In the Tamir Rice case, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor presented extensive evidence,
including an enhancement of the video footage, multiple expert witnesses, multiple fact
witnesses, 911 call recordings, and physical evidence. While the prosecutor’s office is
prohibited from stating what it presented to the grand jury, the prosecutor’s public report
indicates the scope of the proceeding. TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY
PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE,
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/enUS/Rice%20Case%20Report%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2017) [hereinafter TAMIR RICE PROSECUTOR’S REPORT]; see also Cory Shaffer, Grand Jury
Hearing Evidence in Tamir Rice Shooting, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/10/grand_jury_hearing_evidence_in.html
[hereinafter Shaffer, Hearing Evidence].
In the Michael Brown case, prosecutors “took a radically different approach” from the
ordinary grand jury presentation. Kristin Henning, Status, Race and the Rule of Law in the
Grand Jury, 58 HOW. L.J. 833, 835-36 (2015). Prosecutors
presented the grand jury with volumes of evidence, encompassing more than 70 hours
of testimony on 25 separate days over three months. Jurors heard from about 60
witnesses, including three medical examiners and experts on blood, toxicology and
firearms. [Prosecutor] McCulloch claims to have presented “all available evidence” in
the case, including evidence that both supported and contradicted a finding of
probable cause.
Id.
This pattern was also evident “in the unusually detailed presentation of evidence to the grand
jury in the choking death of Eric Garner at the hands of police in Staten Island, New York,
which lead to no indictment.” Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, supra note 1, at 755-56.
17 Henning, supra note 16, at 836 (“[P]rosecutors in Ferguson allowed Wilson to testify
for hours with little cross-examination”). For a discussion of the Tamir Rice case, see infra
Part V.
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Some have argued that the secretive grand jury should be abolished, at least for
police shooting cases18—an approach recently adopted by California. 19
Many have suggested various reforms that might limit or eliminate the inherent
conflict of interest that local prosecutors face—for example, using an independent
prosecutor (sometimes called a special prosecutor) in police use of deadly force
cases, rather than relying on the local prosecutor.20 New York recently adopted a
version of this approach.21 One commentator recently proposed that police officers
should be governed by a separate set of criminal rules and procedures, analogous to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice that governs the conduct of soldiers in the
armed forces.22
Proposals to abolish the grand jury in police use of deadly force cases obviously
solve some of the particular problems associated with the grand jury—such as the
prosecutor’s outsized influence over the grand jury—but do so at the cost of losing
all of the benefits of the grand jury as well. The grand jury, as a democratic body of
laypersons from the community, brings a perspective to the criminal justice system
different from that of government officials of any stripe. Kevin Washburn contends
that the “grand jury can play a significant role in restoring the legitimacy of
American criminal justice, particularly in communities of color.”23 He argues that
there are benefits to “restoring decision-making to community groups” and that
grand jury reform should seek to ensure that the grand jury is closely connected to
“the people in the local community.” 24 Likewise, other scholars have defended the
value of the grand jury, albeit while urging reforms to render grand juries more
independent of prosecutors.25
18

See Melody Gutierrez, Calls Grow to Eliminate Grand Juries' Secrecy in Police
Killings, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Calls-grow-toeliminate-grand-juries-secrecy-5956945.php.
19

Melanie Mason, Gov. Brown Signs Law Barring Grand Juries in Police Deadly Force
Cases, LA TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-browngrand-juries-20150811-story.html.
20 See, e.g., Simmons, Ferguson and Beyond, supra note 5 (discussing independent
prosecutor proposals); Editorial Board, A Crisis of Confidence in Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/a-crisis-of-confidence-inprosecutors.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=c-column-top-spanregion&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=c-column-top-span-region;
Editorial
Board, Police Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-specialprosecutors/2014/12/06/fcf57e28-7cd6-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html.
21 See Noah Remnick, Cuomo to Appoint Special Prosecutor for Killings by Police, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/nyregion/cuomo-to-appointspecial-prosecutor-for-killings-by-police.html?_r=0.
22

Monu Singh Bedi, Toward a Uniform Code of Police Justice, U. OF CHI. LEGAL FORUM,
2016 (Dec. 27, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2890725.
23 Kevin Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 254 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed. 2011).
24

Id. at 254-55.

25 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and
Useful) Role to Play in Criminal Justice?, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
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Proposals to create an independent prosecutor lessen some of the conflicts of
interest faced by a local prosecutor who daily works with and depends on the
cooperation of local law enforcement agencies. But even with an “independent”
prosecutor, the question remains of how the independent prosecutor is appointed—
and whether that appointment process results in a representative before the grand
jury that does not labor under an inherent predisposition toward the police. 26
This Article seeks a different path—one that preserves the use of the grand jury
while attempting to restore its historical independence and once-vital role as a
democratic body providing oversight and accountability for government officials. It
does so not by reforming the grand jury itself, but by giving the grand jury access to
voices outside of the prosecutor’s office. Viewed from the opposite perspective—
from outside the grand jury—the proposal seeks to enable aggrieved private citizens
to have direct access to the grand jury to seek review and possibly criminal charges
against one particular set of government officials—police officers.
II. THE GRAND JURY VICTIM ADVOCATE

This Article proposes a mechanism for the grand jury victims advocate to
enhance the independence of the grand jury in police use of deadly force cases and to
ensure that the grand jury has a chance to hear and consider a presentation of the
evidence by an advocate seeking criminal charges, rather than a prosecutor
potentially seeking political cover.
Briefly stated, a victim advocate would be a representative of the alleged victim
of the potential crime—the complainant. That victim advocate would be given
access to the grand jury equal to that of the prosecutor—the right to present
witnesses and evidence, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to argue
for the grand jury to return an indictment (or a presentment, where available). 27
A grand jury victim advocate would not have to be a lawyer. An alleged victim
of police use of excessive force could appear personally before the grand jury to
argue and present evidence in pursuit of an indictment. A non-lawyer community
activist could appear on behalf of the alleged victim or the family of the alleged
victim. While non-lawyers would lack the expertise a professional prosecutor brings
to the grand jury process, the involvement of a non-lawyer is less problematic before
the grand jury than at a public trial. In many jurisdictions, the grand jury process is
considerably less bound by legal procedural constraints—the rules of evidence are
GRAND JURY 57-84 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed. 2011) (defending the value of the grand
jury exercising discretion in criminal charging); Simmons, Re-Examining, supra note 11, at 2
(“[T]hose who argue that the grand jury is unqualified betray a fundamental misunderstanding
of the true role of grand juries in modern society. In truth, the grand jury is able and qualified
to have a significant, meaningful, and positive impact on the criminal justice system—but
only if we understand its actual function and only if it operates with the proper set of
procedural rules.”).
26 For commentators questioning the effectiveness of an independent prosecutor in police
cases, see, for example, Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, supra note 2, at 148893; Delores Jones-Brown, Opinion, Special Prosecutors are Useful, but not a Guarantee
Against
Prejudice,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
5,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-aspecial-prosecutor/special-prosecutors-are-useful-but-not-a-guarantee-against-prejudice.
27

For a discussion of the presentment power, see infra Part IV.B.
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lessened, and hearsay evidence is often permitted. 28 Moreover, the grand jury is only
determining probable cause—routinely described as a common-sense, practical
determination.29 The grand jury is not making the ultimate decision of whether a
person is guilty of a crime, but only the preliminary determination of whether a
criminal charge is warranted.30
The proposal to give a victim advocate access to the grand jury is limited to cases
involving alleged police misconduct. In ordinary cases not involving police officer
suspects, there does not appear to be a systematic conflict of interest on the part of
the prosecutor that might prevent her from advocating zealously on behalf of the
alleged victim. The role of grand jury victim advocate is designed to enhance the
independence and power of the grand jury in one particular area in which the
independent grand jury historically played a crucial role—the oversight of alleged
government misconduct.
This proposal is similar to one Professor Peter Davis made in 1994, following the
failed prosecution of officers involved in the beating of Rodney King. 31 Professor
Davis suggested giving the victim of alleged police brutality
access to the grand jury—against the wishes of the public prosecutor—in
the context of police brutality cases and other instances of governmental
misconduct, because these cases: (1) often involve a built-in prosecutorial
conflict of interest, (2) present every opportunity for the public prosecutor
to drag his feet, and (3) pose questions of enormous public importance. 32
Part III of this Article examines the historical role of the grand jury as an
independent, democratic body providing accountability for misconduct by
government officials. It discusses the unique benefits of oversight conducted by a
democratic lay institution as opposed to oversight by other government officials.
This important historical function provides some reason to be cautious about
proposals to abolish the grand jury altogether.
Part IV of this Article turns to the benefits of grand jury independence and how a
grand jury victim advocate could significantly assist in re-establishing grand jury
independence. It notes how, in police use of deadly force cases, the most common
criticism of the grand jury—that it fails to adequately screen cases and merely rubber
stamps all charges for the prosecutor—is reversed. Rather than failing to adequately
serve as a shield, the grand jury in police use of deadly force cases often fails to act
with adequate zeal—fails to bring charges against officers when there is good cause
to proceed notwithstanding a reluctant prosecutor. The Article discusses how a grand
jury victim advocate would address this problem by ensuring there is a party before

28 SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 4:20 (“In most jurisdictions the rules that govern
the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings are relaxed to some degree in grand jury
proceedings. . . . [T]he grand jury developed as a lay body that traditionally operated free of
the technical rules of judicial procedure and evidence.”).
29 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983) (referring to “the practical,
common-sense judgment called for in making a probable-cause determination.”).
30

SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 4.5; Flynn, supra note 1.

31

See Davis, supra note 7, at 275.

32

Id. at 296-97.
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the grand jury earnestly and vigorously seeking to establish the required probable
cause.
Part V of this article considers this proposal in light of one particular high-profile
police use of force case from Cleveland—the shooting of Tamir Rice and the
controversial conduct of prosecutors during the subsequent grand jury proceeding. It
evaluates how that case might have proceeded differently if a grand jury victim
advocate had been permitted access to the grand jury.
III. THE GRAND JURY’S HISTORICAL ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF MISCONDUCT BY
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Throughout British and American history, the grand jury often played a critical
role in public oversight, in particular serving as a watchdog against misconduct by
government officials. In its earliest form, the British grand jury was a tool of the
king—a mechanism for using prominent local men to bring to the attention of the
monarchy persons believed in the community to have committed crimes.33 Henry II
in 1166 provided that a group of prominent local men should “disclose under oath
the names of those the community believed guilty of criminal offenses.” 34
Centuries later, a second role emerged—the grand jury provided a shield between
the king and the citizenry, refusing to issue indictments in baseless or politicallymotivated prosecutions.35 The group of local citizens served not only to assist the
king in identifying and charging potential criminals, but also in refusing to allow
criminal charges when they were unwarranted. 36
These two functions are reflected in the “colorful metaphor” now commonly
used—“the grand jury acts as both shield and sword.”37 The “sword” is the grand
jury’s role in “investigating whether crimes have been committed and, if so, who
committed them.”38 The “shield” is the grand jury’s role in ensuring, once a
government prosecutor is pursuing a criminal charge against a named individual, that

33

RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1634-1941 1 (Brown U. ed., 1963); see also Simmons, Re-Examining, supra note 11, at 4-5
(describing the early grand jury accusation power, and noting that “[t]here is no evidence that
the grand jury acted as a ‘shield’ protecting the accused from the Crown during these first few
hundred years”).
34 YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 1; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional
Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398, 408-09 (2006) (“During the first
three centuries of the grand jury’s use in England, it served largely the interests of the
monarchy.”) [hereinafter Fairfax, Jr., Jurisdictional Heritage].
35 YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 2; Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 34, at 409
(“English history demonstrates that the grand jury was transformed from merely an arm of the
Crown into a protector of individual liberty.”).
36

Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 34, at 409.

37

SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 1:7; see also Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand
Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 262-63 (1995)
(stating that “grand juries perform only two tasks,” the “screening function” and the
investigative function).
38

SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13.
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“there is sufficient evidentiary support to justify holding the accused for trial on each
charge.”39
Somewhat overlooked is the third role of the grand jury—that of the grand jury
as a body of citizens playing an administrative role, including providing oversight
over the conduct (or misconduct) of government. 40 This role was prominent in
colonial and early American grand juries 41 although it has diminished substantially
in modern times.42 As shown below, however, remnants of this role remain in many
American jurisdictions. It is this unique function that may provide a powerful tool in
the contemporary struggle to provide adequate accountability for law enforcement
officers who misuse their powers.
The role of the grand jury as government watchdog was prevalent during the
American Revolution when colonial grand juries wielded their powers of accusation
against British officials—such as British soldiers—for perceived abuses of
government powers.43 “In the grand jury discontented American colonists had
discovered a potent weapon with which to harass royal officials and protest against
British authority.”44 First—acting as shield—colonial grand juries refused to indict
colonists engaged in rebellious acts against the British Crown, such as leaders of the
Stamp Act riots.45
More significantly, colonial grand juries also turned their powers affirmatively
against British government officials. For example, “In March, 1769, the Boston
inquest denounced soldiers quartered in the town for breaking and entering
dwellings, waylaying citizens, and wounding a justice of the peace during a riot.” 46
Grand juries throughout the colonies issued general complaints against Great Britain
and in defense of colonists’ rights, and these pronouncements were copied and
reprinted in colonial newspapers.47
Even before the Revolution, the grand jury’s power of government oversight was
evident in the first grand jury to operate in the colonies. 48 In the Massachusetts Bay
39

Id.

40

See Ronald F. Wright, Grand Juries and Expertise in the Administrative State, in
GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 293, 293 (Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.
ed., 2011) (referring to “one strand in the history of the American grand jury: the grand jury’s
administrative functions, which were distinct from its power to indict targets of criminal
investigations”).
41

See YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 2-3.

42

Wright, supra note 40, at 298.

43

YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 27.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 29-30; see also Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 34, at 410 (quoting
Renée B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L. J. 1333, 1337
(1994) (“Colonial grand juries also played a part in expressing colonists’ dissatisfaction with
the exercise of monarchical power by nullifying attempted prosecutions of critics of the
Crown and aggressively issuing ‘angry and well-publicized presentments and indictments’
against representatives of the Crown.”)).
47

YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 34-35.

48

Id. at 6.
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Colony in 1635, the grand jury included “several of the colony’s magistrates” among
the offenders it presented for charging to Governor John Winthrop. 49
Even beyond the power to charge local officials with criminal offenses, the grand
jury in colonial America “acted in the nature of local assemblies: making known the
wishes of the people, proposing new laws, protesting against abuses in government,
performing administrative tasks, and looking after the welfare of their
communities.”50 Grand juries in early American history were often charged with
performing administrative tasks, including ongoing oversight of government.51 “In
Indiana and Illinois every panel had to inquire in to [sic] the conditions of the local
jail and the treatment of prisoners and to report its findings to the court.” 52 In
Arkansas, grand juries were charged with “examining toll roads and bridges and
reporting those found to be unsafe or impassable.” 53 Grand juries sent petitions to
state legislatures asking for action on items ranging from wolves to taxation to the
conduct of the judicial system.54
In the nineteenth century, as settlers moved West, grand juries played a
prominent role in government oversight. Some territories, such as Arizona and New
Mexico, “charged inquests to investigate all ‘wilful and corrupt misconduct of public
officials.’”55 “[E]ven in those jurisdictions where there was no specific statute, grand
juries denounced and indicted public officials they found guilty of malfeasance or
corruption.”56 Grand juries throughout the West charged government officials with
misconduct including corruption by government ration officers, theft by federal
Indian agents, receipt of illegal fees by a county judge and clerk, and embezzlement
by local officials.57 The grand jury’s power of investigation and charging “frequently
proved the only effective weapon against organized crime, malfeasance in office,
and corruption in high places.”58
Peter Davis describes how nineteenth-century grand juries took on organized
crime and corruption in local government, either without the assistance of or against
the wishes of the local prosecutor—who was sometimes complicit in the corrupt
system.59 A New York grand jury played a crucial role in dismantling the Boss
Tweed ring in 1872:
[Grand jurors] set out to find evidence against city officials without the
assistance of experts from the district attorney’s office. The jury
49

Id.

50

Id. at 2; see also Wright, supra note 40, at 294-96.

51

Wright, supra note 40, at 295-96.

52

YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 79.

53

Id. at 79-80.

54

Id. at 80-81.

55

Id. at 160.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 160-61.

58

Id. at 3.

59

Davis, supra note 7, at 303-04.
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summoned all manner of witnesses and interrogated them in secret
session. To cover all possible sources of information, the twenty-one
jurors split up into committees of two and three. These committees visited
banks to check on the accounts of public officials, called at the homes of
witnesses who were unable to come to the jury, and checked the
operations of each of the city departments. 60
Another New York grand jury investigating illegal gambling discovered that the
local prosecutor, A.B. Gardiner, was obstructing their efforts. 61 They “began to
subpoena their witnesses directly, without going through the District Attorney’s
office,” at times asking the district attorney to leave the room during witness
testimony.62 The grand jury also spoke “directly to the judge for legal advice.” 63
In the early twentieth century, a Cleveland grand jury continued this tradition of
independence. In 1933, a grand jury investigated the city police department, “[l]ed
by its energetic and fearless foreman, William Feather.” 64 It issued a report charging
that “the entire city had been intimidated by union racketeers who received
protection from city officials.”65 The Cleveland Plain Dealer commended Feather’s
grand jury for its aggressive investigation—praising its contrast with the tradition of
grand juries serving only as “the stuffed furniture in the stage setting.” 66 The grand
jury received information from citizens “pointing out districts where police allegedly
protect[ed] vice, crime and gambling,” including some accusations against officers
who allegedly “receive[d] weekly payments for protection.” 67 The Feather grand jury
concluded by reminding “inquests throughout the state of Ohio that they too could
initiate independent investigations.”68
The independence of the grand jury from the prosecutor’s office was a critical
aspect of the grand jury’s ability to combat local government corruption. “Where
corruption extended to the office of the district attorney, the grand jury’s ability to
act effectively depended upon its independence of the prosecutor. When necessary,
juries demonstrated that they could take investigations into their own hands, ignoring
the district attorney.”69
This third role of the grand jury—government watchdog—has diminished
significantly over the twentieth century, as other government institutions have
developed to play that role.70 In a number of jurisdictions around the country,
60

Id. at 302-03 (citing YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 188).

61

Id. at 303-04 (citing YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 188-89).

62

Id. at 304.

63

Id.

64

YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 234.

65

Id.

66

War on the “Known”, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 10, 1933, at 10.

67

Feather Demands Record of Police, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 14, 1933, at

68

YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 234.

69

Id. at 208.

70

See Wright, supra note 40, at 298-301.

5.
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however, statutes charge grand juries with various government oversight functions
independent of their role as either sword or shield with respect to criminal charging.
For example, an Ohio statute requires grand juries to regularly “visit the county jail,
examine its conditions, and inquire into the discipline and treatment of the prisoners,
their habits, diet, and accommodations,” and then report in writing to the court. 71 In
Alabama, the grand jury likewise is charged with conducting a personal inspection of
the jail to assess the safekeeping and health of the prisoners. 72 Alabama grand juries
are also charged with examining the country treasury and inspecting sheriff records
related to the feeding of prisoners. 73 Grand juries have similar duties in a number of
states, including examination of the condition of jails, 74 as well as access to public
records generally.75
This history suggests that grand juries may have particular advantages in
providing oversight of government misconduct. In modern times, many of the
“public oversight” or quasi-administrative roles of the grand jury have been taken
over by government officials and administrative agencies. 76 But at least in some
contexts—such as oversight of the police—there are serious drawbacks to using
other public officials rather than a democratic body composed of laypersons from the
community. As noted above, many have observed how extraordinarily difficult it is
for a prosecutor—who works daily with, and depends on the cooperation of, the
police—to serve as an effective, neutral, and unbiased check on police misconduct.
In this context, the grand jury as voice of the community may prove particularly
valuable. As a democratic body of laypersons, the grand jury is not beholden to other
government officials. Grand jurors are not regular, repeat players in the criminal
justice system and, thus, may be more likely to maintain an independent and
unbiased perspective toward police officers than those who work with them daily.
In the context of administrative law, Ronald Wright notes that “[t]he exclusion of
citizen participation from the administrative process leads to unsound outcomes. An
71

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.21 (West 2017).

72

ALA. CODE § 12-16-191 (2017).

73

ALA. CODE § 12-16-192, 193.

74

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.40.060 (LexisNexis 2016) (“The grand jury is
entitled to access, at all reasonable times, to the public jails and prisons.”); ARK. CODE ANN. §
12-41-508 (LexisNexis 2016) (instilling in the grand jury the duty to visit and report on
condition of the jail and the treatment of prisoners); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-78 (LexisNexis
2016) (instilling in the grand jury the duty to inspect the jail and report on sanitary conditions
and treatment of prisoners); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-109 (LexisNexis 2017) (providing
grand jury power to “visit the jail, examine its state and condition, and examine and inquire
into the discipline and treatment of prisoners, their habits, diet, and accommodations”).
75 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.40.060 (“The grand jury is entitled to access, at all
reasonable times, . . . to offices pertaining to the courts of justice in the state, and to all other
public offices, and to the examination of all public records in the state.”); CAL. PENAL CODE §
921 (2016) (“The grand jury is entitled to free access, at all reasonable times, to the public
prisons, and to the examination, without charge, of all public records within the county.”);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 29-10.1-23 (West 2017) (“Grand jurors are entitled to free access, at
all reasonable times, to public prisons, and to the examination, without charge, of all public
records in the county.”).
76

Wright, supra note 40, at 298-301.
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agency cut off from the citizens might pursue a policy that harms many people
because it has been ‘captured’ by a regulated group.” 77 Analogously, in the context
of police oversight, it is easy to see how a prosecutor might be “captured” by the
regulated group—the police department. Richard Younger powerfully sums up the
grand jury’s unique advantages in regulating government misconduct:
The grand jury enables the American people to act for themselves rather
than have an official act for them. It is the one institution that combines
the necessary measure of disinterestedness with sufficient authority to
investigate effectively malfeasance and corruption in public office.
Today, as in the past, it is the one body that can effectively handle the
complaints of individual citizens, whether the grievances be against their
fellow citizens or against their government. . . . At a time when
centralization has narrowed the area of democratic control, grand juries
give the people an opportunity to participate in their government and to
make their wishes known.78
IV. RESTORING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GRAND JURY IN GOVERNMENT
OVERSIGHT

A. The Rubber Stamp Grand Jury Versus the Toothless Grand Jury
Many scholars, as well as persons who have served on grand juries, have
bemoaned (or simply described) the fact that the grand jury no longer seems to have
the independence that it had historically, but instead has become dominated by the
prosecutor.79
Dean Phyllis Crocker served as foreperson of a Cuyahoga County (Cleveland)
grand jury in 2003. In an article she wrote following that experience, she noted how
the grand jury was not institutionally capable of true independence:
The reality is that grand juries depend greatly on prosecutors. Due to that
dependence, grand juries rarely decline to indict, and are often criticized
as mere rubber stamps for the prosecutor. It is not surprising, however,
that grand jurors rely on prosecutors. They have to hear and decide large
numbers of cases in a short amount of time, yet have little knowledge
about the criminal justice system, let alone the elements of criminal
offenses. Grand jurors know what the judge states in the initial general

77

Id. at 304.

78

YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 245-46.

79 See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 22-24
(2016); STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (Oxford 2012);
YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 241-246; Washburn, supra note 23; Phyllis L. Crocker, Appointed
but (Nearly) Prevented From Serving: My Experiences as a Grand Jury Foreperson, 2 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 290 (2004); R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand
Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 365 (2000).
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instructions, and what the prosecutor tells them about the law as to
specific offenses. This creates a singular reliance on the prosecutor. 80
In the context of police use of deadly force cases, this lack of independence and
over-reliance on the prosecutor plays out in reverse of the ordinary problem: rather
than being too quick to yield to a prosecutor seeking an indictment in a case that may
not warrant one, a too-compliant grand jury in a police use of deadly force case
readily acquiesces to the prosecutor’s view (either explicit or implicit) that no
charges are warranted.
Thus, instead of rubber stamping dubious charges, the grand jury in police use of
deadly force cases runs the risk of becoming toothless—failing to bring forth charges
against police officers for misconduct due to the outsized influence of another
government official, the prosecutor. The compliant grand jury simply reflects the
views of the prosecutor, whose professional conflict of interest in cases involving
allegations against police officers may make him or her an uncertain and unreliable
advocate for victims of police misconduct.
Grand jury reforms have often focused on ways to improve the grand jury’s
screening (shield) function. More recently, scholars “have argued that the grand jury
has a prosecutorial role to play as well.”81 In particular, these scholars argue that the
grand jury “in effect ‘partners’ with the prosecutor to determine not only whether
there is probable cause to believe an individual committed a crime, but also whether
the individual should be prosecuted.”82 Fundamentally, “the grand jury’s essential
task must be to express the will of the community about the prosecution of the
law.”83 That includes the community’s will not only about when criminal charges
should not be pursued, but also the community’s will about when criminal charges
should be pursued.
B. Public Participation in Charging: Presentments, Petitions, and Private
Prosecution
Today, professional prosecutors largely control the charging decision—when and
whether criminal charges should be pursued and against whom. 84 Historically, there
were more opportunities for public participation in charging, and several of these
mechanisms persist to varying degrees today. These mechanisms are not the primary
80

Crocker, supra note 79; see also Wright, supra note 40, at 299-300 (noting courts’
denials of grand jury requests for support staff; “[p]reventing the grand jury from appointing
and controlling its own support staff made the institution more and more ineffective an
administrative matters, and increasingly dependent on the full-time prosecutor”); Leipold,
supra note 37, at 264 (“The root cause of the institution’s inability to screen is the jurors’ lack
of competence to perform their task.”).
81 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Remaking the Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 323, 329 (Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) (emphasis in
original).
82

Id. at 329-30 (emphasis in original).

83

Washburn, supra note 23, at 255.

84

See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009) (describing the remarkably unreviewable power and discretion
of the prosecutor); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1523-1554 (1981) (analyzing the prosecutor’s broad discretion in charging).
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focus of this Article, but they bear brief mention both as a reminder of grand jury
independence and as additional possible reforms. Moreover, a grand jury victim
advocate might enable grand juries to discover, or rediscover, some of these ways of
exercising their oversight powers over police officers.
One example is the grand jury presentment power. At common law, a
presentment was “the notice taken by a grand Jury of any offense from their own
knowledge or observation, without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit
of the king.”85 Today, “[a] presentment is a charge the grand jury brings on its own
initiative. In contrast, an indictment is almost always first drawn up by a prosecutor
and then submitted to the grand jury for approval.” 86
A full discussion of the presentment power is beyond the scope of this Article.87
For present purposes, suffice it to say that the presentment power is an example of
the historical power of the grand jury to initiate criminal charges independently of
the state prosecuting attorney.
Some states today explicitly recognize the grand jury presentment power in state
statutes. In North Carolina, for example, the grand jury is authorized to
investigate any offense as to which no bill of indictment has been
submitted to it by the prosecutor and issue a presentment accusing a
named person or named persons with one or more criminal offenses if it
has found probable cause for the charges made.88
In other states, the status of the grand jury’s presentment power is unclear. In
Ohio, for example, the state Constitution (like the federal Constitution) specifically
mentions presentment as an alternative to indictment: “no person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or
indictment of a grand jury.”89 Yet, the Ohio Revised Code does not contain any
statutes discussing, authorizing, or prohibiting the issuance of a presentment by
grand jury.90
85 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301; see also Richard H. Kuh, The Grand
Jury “Presentment”: Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1103 n.1 (1955)
(“Originally, indictments were couched in formal terms written on parchment in Latin.
Presentments, brought in by lay juries on their own initiative, were informal and in English. If
they contained criminal charges, such charges were then formalized and followed by the
translated formal indictments.”).
86 Lettow, supra note 46; see also 1 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL
GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:4 (2d ed. 2016) (“The difference between [a
presentment and an indictment] was that a grand jury initiated a presentment on its own, but
received an indictment from a prosecutor.”).
87 For discussions of the presentment power, see generally BRENNER & SHAW, supra note
86; SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13; Susan B. Brenner, The “Voice of the Community:” A
Comparison of Federal and State Grand Jury Practice, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 109-19
(1995); Lettow, supra note 46; Kuh, supra note 85.
88

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-628(a)(4) (2017).

89

Compare OH. CONST. art. I, § 10, with U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury”).
90

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2939 (West 2017).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/8

16

2017]

RESTORING INDEPENDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY

551

Ohio history includes cases prosecuted on presentment rather than indictment. 91
At the same time, Ohio courts have rejected the power of grand juries to issue grand
jury reports on civil matters where they are not expressly statutorily authorized to do
so.92 There is no recent authority, furthermore, stating whether Ohio grand juries
retain the common law power to issue charges by presentment.
Suja Thomas bemoans the substantial loss of the presentment power in many
American jurisdictions: “grand juries do not serve the independent investigative
function through presentments that they performed in the past.” 93 She notes the
particular relevance of this loss in police shooting cases: in jurisdictions that have
eliminated the grand jury presentment power, “grand juries cannot bring an action
against a police office for shooting a civilian without the acquiescence of the
prosecution.”94
Another vestige of the public’s historical access to charging decisions can be
seen in an Ohio statute authorizing any “private citizen having knowledge of the
facts” to “seek[] to cause an arrest or prosecution” by filing an affidavit charging an
offense.95 This relatively obscure statute was used by a group of eight clergy
members and community activists from Cleveland to prompt judicial action in the
Tamir Rice case.96
The statute states that a citizen may file this affidavit “with a reviewing official
for the purpose of review to determine if a complaint should be filed by the
prosecuting attorney[.]”97 In the Tamir Rice case, the citizen affidavits filed June 8,
2015, accused officers Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback of various offenses
under Ohio law, including aggravated murder, murder, and involuntary
manslaughter.98
Cleveland Municipal Court Judge Ronald Adrine ruled on the petition on June
11, 2015. Judge Adrine recognized that section 2935.09 “provides private citizens
the ability to bring forward accusations by affidavit to cause an arrest or
prosecution.”99 However, he also recognized that the statute did not actually
authorize either the private citizens or the reviewing court to initiate a criminal

91

See, e.g., State v. Laning, 18 Ohio Dec. 672, 675 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1908).

92

See Simington v. Shimp, 398 N.E.2d 812, 814-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).

93 THOMAS, supra note 79, at 39. “For all practical purposes, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure have abolished the grand jury’s presentment power.” Lettow, supra note
46, at 1343.
94

THOMAS, supra note 79, at 39.

95

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.09(D).

96

Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Group Seeks Arrests of Officers Involved in Tamir Rice
Shooting,
CLEVELAND.COM
(June
9,
2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/06/cleveland_group_releases_affid.html
[hereinafter Shaffer, Cleveland Group].
97

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.09(D)

98

Shaffer, Cleveland Group, supra note 96.

99

Judgment Entry at 1, In re: Aff. Relating to Timothy Loehmann & Frank Garmback,
June 11, 2015.
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charge.100 Rather, the court interpreted its statutory role as being “advisory in
nature.”101 The court explained that actual criminal charges would be filed, if at all,
by the city prosecutor or the county prosecutor, in conjunction with a grand jury for
any felony charges.102
The court also determined, after reviewing conflicting provisions of Ohio law,
that the court did not have the legal authority to issue arrest warrants based on the
citizen affidavits.103 Instead, its task was simply to issue a determination of whether
probable cause existed.104
The court discussed the evidence presented in support of the affidavits—the
video of the Tamir Rice shooting. 105 The court described the video as “notorious and
hard to watch” and stated that “[a]fter watching it several times, this court is still
thunderstruck by how quickly this event turned deadly.” 106 The court noted that the
video quality was not excellent, but that it did not appear to show Tamir Rice
“making any furtive movement prior to, or at, the moment he is shot.” 107 Tamir
Rice’s arms “do not appear to be raised or out-stretched,” and “[t]here appears to be
little if any time reflected in the video for Rice to react or respond. . . . Literally, the
entire encounter is over in an instant.” 108
Ultimately, the court found probable cause for charges of murder, involuntary
manslaughter, reckless homicide, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty against
Officer Loehmann, and probable cause for charges of negligent homicide and
dereliction of duty against Officer Garmback. 109

100

Id. at 4.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

The court noted a conflict between an Ohio statute and the Ohio Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2935.10, provides that unless the affidavit was
not filed in good faith or was not meritorious (which the court interpreted to require a finding
of probable cause), the reviewing court “shall forthwith issue a warrant for the arrest of the
person charged in the affidavit.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.10(A). In contrast, Ohio Rule
4(A)(1) requires that a complaint be filed before an arrest warrant can be issued—and §
2935.09 authorizes a citizen petition, but does not describe it as a criminal complaint. See
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 4(A)(1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2935.09(D). Thus, there was a conflict
between Rule 4(A)(1) and § 2935.10(A). Under Ohio law, the Ohio Rules supersede
conflicting statutes so long as the legal issue in question is procedural rather than a substantive
right. See Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 873 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ohio 2007). The court apparently
interpreted this provision as a procedural one, as it ruled that Rule 4(A)(1) superseded §
2935.10(A)(1) in this respect.
104

Judgment Entry, supra note 99, at 4.

105

Id. at 2-3.

106

Id. at 2.

107

Id. at 3.

108

Id.

109 Id. at 8-9; see also Brandon Blackwell, Judge Finds Probable Cause for Murder
Charge Against Office Who Killed Tamir Rice, CLEVELAND.COM (June 11, 2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/06/judge_finds_probable_cause_for.html.
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As noted above, this probable cause determination did not result in the arrest of
the officers or the initiation of any criminal proceedings. Thus, Ohio’s statutory
mechanism for citizen affidavits provides a way for citizens to obtain a probable
cause determination and to bring the alleged crimes to the attention of the
prosecutor, the police, and the public. It does not, however, actually empower
citizens to participate in the charging decision itself.
A final possibility, one that does not appear to exist in most American
jurisdictions, is to permit private prosecution of criminal charges in the event the
public prosecutor declines to pursue them. 110 Private prosecutions were common in
American history and remain a feature of the criminal justice system in England. 111
This represents a more radical proposal than the Ohio “affidavit” process, which
permits citizens to seek a probable cause determination but leaves the charging
decision in the hands of the prosecutor.
Again, these mechanisms for private participation in the charging decision are
not the primary focus of this Article. They do illustrate, however, various procedures
whereby the state prosecutor may not have total control over the charging decision.
A grand jury victim advocate would serve a somewhat similar function—to
empower a panel of independent citizens to consider and potentially initiate criminal
charges even if the state prosecutor is disinclined from doing so. The grand jury
victim advocate would assist the grand jury in recognizing and recovering its legal
independence from the state prosecutor and, thus, discovering some of the ways it
might exercise oversight powers over government officials, in particularly police
officers.
C. The Grand Jury’s Legal Independence from the Prosecutor
As a legal and historical matter, the grand jury is not a creature of the prosecutor.
The prosecutor does not convene the grand jury or (legally) have authority or control
over it.112 Many have written about how, as a practical matter, the prosecutor has
very strong influence over the grand jury. 113 The point here is simply that
prosecutor’s grand jury power is not grounded in early historical practice or in the
formal legal make-up or power of the grand jury.
Instead, the grand jury is at least somewhat independent of the other parts of the
criminal justice system. The court convenes the grand jury, selects its members and
foreperson, and gives the jurors general instructions. 114 After the grand jury has been
110 See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 659, 661 (2010) (surveying the history of private prosecution, and arguing “that
private prosecutions can be a useful adjunct to the more familiar public model, potentially
freeing up scarce public resources while at the same time vindicating the interests—both of
the victim and the public—in the enforcement of the criminal law. It is widely acknowledged
that the state possesses limited resources to allocate to the criminal justice system.”).
111

Id.

112 Peter F. Vaira, Role of the Prosecutor Inside the Grand Jury Room: Where is the Foul
Line, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1129, 1130 (1984) (arguing that the balance between the
grand jury’s investigative role and “its role as an independent accusatory body . . . lies with
the integrity and the professionalism of the prosecutor.”).
113

See supra note 1, note 79.

114

SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13, at §4:1.
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created, however, the court’s involvement is largely complete, and the grand jury
operates without ongoing direct court supervision.115
The prosecutor’s legal power before the grand jury typically comes from a state
statute that gives the prosecutor a right to appear before the grand jury and present
evidence, argument, and legal instruction. 116
D. The Grand Jury Victim Advocate as a Voice Aligned with the Complainant
A number of reform proposals, noted above, seek various ways to minimize or
mitigate the inherent conflict of interest facing a professional prosecutor who is
considering criminal charges against the police. The key advantage to the grand jury
victim advocate proposal is that it counteracts those concerns by ensuring that there
is an advocate before the grand jury whose interests are firmly aligned with the
alleged victim of the police use of force.
Of course, a victim advocate would not be an objective and neutral voice—a
victim advocate would undoubtedly look at the case from the particular perspective
of the alleged victim. The proposal is, therefore, not designed to find a “neutral”
voice, but to counteract what might be an inherent and inescapable pro-police bias
with another voice that has a bias or perspective of the alleged victim. 117
The ultimate goal is not to create a grand jury proceeding that is slanted in favor
of the police or against the police, but to empower the grand jury to rediscover its
independence of the state prosecutor and to achieve a level of neutrality. As Peter
Davis explains,
the benefits of public access to the grand jury are significant. Civilian
participation in criminal prosecution brings an entirely different
perspective to law enforcement. When citizens are free to approach the
grand jury directly or through the impaneling judge, the grand jury
“‘breathes the spirit of the community’ as no prosecutor could ever do.” 118
The grand jury victim advocate would, therefore, help the grand jury to speak again
as the voice of the community, rather than simply parrot the voice of the prosecutor.
V. CASE STUDY FOR THE GRAND JURY VICTIM ADVOCATE: THE TAMIR RICE
INVESTIGATION
This Article now turns to consider a particular case study—the Tamir Rice grand
jury proceeding—to evaluate how the presence of a grand jury victim advocate
might have changed the course of those proceedings.
115

For example, the judge is not one of the persons legally permitted to be present during
grand jury proceedings. Id. at § 4:10.
116 See OHIO REVISED CODE § 2939.10 (2017); see also SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 13,
at § 4:15 (“In the federal courts and in the vast majority of states, the prosecutor has common
law or statutory authority to attend the grand jury’s sessions (except those at which the grand
jury deliberates and votes), to examine the witnesses that appear before the grand jury, and to
give legal advice.”).
117

Davis, supra note 7, at 356 (“[G]iving citizens direct access to the grand jury helps to
ameliorate the problem of the symbiotic relationship between police and public prosecutors.”).
118 Id. at 298 (quoting YOUNGER, supra note 33, at 230 (in turn quoting U.S. District
Attorney George Z. Medalie, Grand Juries Value, THE PANEL 16 (1931))).
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Because of grand jury secrecy rules, there are significant limitations on the
public’s knowledge about what occurred during the Tamir Rice grand jury
proceeding. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Tim McGinty released a significant
amount of evidence that was gathered during the police investigation into Tamir
Rice’s shooting by Cleveland Police.119 He also released several expert reports he
commissioned for presentation to the grand jury.120 But as in most jurisdictions,
Ohio’s grand jury secrecy rules prohibit the prosecutor, as well as grand jurors
themselves, from revealing what actually occurred inside the grand jury room,
except in certain narrow circumstances. 121
These grand jury secrecy rules do not apply to witnesses who testify before the
grand jury122—thus, there is no prohibition on a grand jury witness repeating
publicly what she told the grand jury or describing what she experienced when
testifying before the grand jury. As a result, one source of public information about
what occurred in the Tamir Rice grand jury are interviews given to a journalist by
several of the witnesses who testified in that proceeding. 123 In addition, the police
union representing Officers Loehmann and Garmback also provided some
information about what occurred when those officers appeared before the grand
jury.124
These sources reveal two notable aspects of the grand jury proceedings in the
Tamir Rice case: (1) the two officers involved in the shooting were permitted to give
self-serving statements before the grand jury without being subjected to crossexamination, and (2) experts in police use of force who testified that the use of force
was unreasonable were treated with hostility and aggressive cross-examination by
the prosecutors. Both of those aspects of the proceeding likely would have been very
different had a grand jury victim advocate been present and participating.
First, according to union officials, Officer Loehmann and Officer Garmback
appeared before the grand jury and gave sworn statements describing their version of

119 TAMIR RICE PROSECUTOR’S REPORT, supra note 16; see also Shaffer, Hearing Evidence,
supra note 16.
120

Steve Almasy, Tamir Rice Shooting was ‘Reasonable,’ Two Experts Conclude, CNN
(Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/10/us/tamir-rice-shooting-reports/.
121 See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E) (“A grand juror [or] prosecuting attorney . . . may disclose
matters occurring before the grand jury . . . only when so directed by the court preliminary to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding, or when permitted by the court at the request of
the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury.”).
122

See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 634 (1990) (“[N]either the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor the drafters of similar rules in the majority of the
States, found it necessary to impose an obligation of secrecy on grand jury witnesses with
respect to their own testimony”). The Court in Butterworth held that Florida’s secrecy rules
for grand jury witnesses were unconstitutional, at least as applied to witnesses who spoke after
the conclusion of the grand jury proceeding. Id.
123

Flynn, supra note 1.

124 Cory Shaffer, Officers in Tamir Rice Case Were Sworn in Before Grand Jury,
Answered No Questions, Union Says, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/12/officers_in_tamir_rice_case_we.html
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what happened in the Tamir Rice shooting. 125 Even though they voluntarily gave
those statements, prosecutors did not conduct a cross-examination or ask either
officer any questions.126
The law is clear that once a witness appears in a legal proceeding and begins to
testify, he has waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as to the
subject of his testimony, at least in the proceeding in which he is testifying. “[W]hen
a defendant chooses to testify in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment does not
allow him to refuse to answer related questions on cross-examination.”127 The
defendant “has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor
without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.”128 This
general principle is the same whether the witness is testifying in a criminal trial, a
civil trial, or before a grand jury—“[t]he reasoning of these cases applies to a witness
in any proceeding who voluntarily takes the stand and offers testimony in his own
behalf.”129
In the Tamir Rice grand jury, once Officer Garmback and Officer Loehmann
read their prepared statements under oath, they had waived their Fifth Amendment
rights as to that grand jury proceeding. It is less clear whether those statements also
constituted a waiver at a potential future criminal trial. 130 But by reading the
statements about what happened during their encounter with Tamir Rice, Officer
Loehmann and Officer Garmback each waived their Fifth Amendment rights about
that subject, at least for the purposes of the grand jury proceeding. 131
Thus, the prosecutors had a remarkable opportunity—to thoroughly question the
two officers involved in the shooting, under oath and before the grand jury, to test
125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Kansas v. Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 596, 601 (2013).

128

Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).

129

Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958).

130 Courts are divided on this question, with the majority holding that testimony before a
grand jury does not constitute a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege at a subsequent trial
because the trial is a separate proceeding from the grand jury process. See Michael A.
DiSabatino, Right of Witness in Federal Court to Claim Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
After Giving Sworn Evidence on Same Matter in Other Proceedings, 42 A.L.R. FED. 793
(originally published in 1979).
131 Another possibility is that prosecutors agreed to let Officer Loehmann and Officer
Garmack read the statements before the grand jury and provided the officers an assurance that
this testimony would not constitute a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right. (Because the
prosecutors are forbidden by grand jury secrecy rules from discussing what occurred before
the grand jury, they are unable to respond to the account given by the union officials.) If
prosecutors offered such assurances, then it is possible that the statements did not constitute a
waiver. In that scenario, what is remarkable is that prosecutors agreed to allow them to read
self-serving statements without submitting themselves to questioning. Prosecutors in similar
situations offer a suspect a choice—a suspect may choose to testify before the grand jury and
tell his side of the story. In exchange, however, prosecutors will cross-examine the suspect.
Alternatively, the suspect can invoke his Fifth Amendment right and refuse to provide any
testimony. But if the suspect will invoke, prosecutors ordinarily will not allow the suspect to
give a one-sided, self-serving statement, untested by questioning or cross-examination.
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whether the officers’ self-serving statements proved reliable under crossexamination. Their reported failure to ask any questions is astounding. Had a grand
jury victim advocate—a lawyer representing the Tamir Rice family—been
participating in the grand jury proceedings, both Officer Loehmann and Officer
Garmback would have been subjected to extensive cross-examination after each read
his sworn statement. This would have permitted the grand jury an invaluable
opportunity to observe each officer’s demeanor, the consistency of their accounts
(with each other and with the other available evidence), and to hear additional details
beyond those the officers themselves chose to address.
The problem with allowing a witness to give a self-serving statement while still
maintaining the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege has been repeatedly
explained by the Supreme Court. A witness
cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him not only
[the choice not to testify] but, if he elects to testify, an immunity from
cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute. It would
make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against
judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the
truth a party offers to tell. 132
Once a witness “provides testimony and then refuses to answer potentially
incriminating questions, ‘[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function
of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance
of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against selfincrimination.’”133
The other significant detail that has emerged about the conduct of prosecutors
during the grand jury comes from three expert witnesses who appeared and testified
before the grand jury.134 Roger Clark, a former LAPD officer, is an expert on police
use of force who was hired by lawyers for the Tamir Rice family to review the case.
He concluded—contrary to the view of experts retained by the prosecution—that the
use of deadly force was unreasonable.135 Notably, prosecutors permitted him to
appear and testify before the grand jury—an accommodation to the Tamir Rice
family.136 Clark later recounted that the prosecutors treated him with disdain, open
hostility, and aggressive cross-examination.137
Clark stated that, during his testimony before the grand jury, two prosecutors
were present, one sitting with the grand jurors at their conference table “as if he were
one of them.”138 Both “smirked” a lot.139 According to Clark, one of the prosecutors

132

Brown, 356 U.S. at 155-56.

133

Kansas v. Cheever, 134 S. Ct. 596, 601 (2013) (quoting Brown, 356 U.S. at 156).

134

Flynn, supra note 1.

135

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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explained to the grand jury that the two officers “had to be brave” when approaching
Tamir Rice, and that, in fact, “[t]hey were brave that day.”140
The Rice family also hired Jeffrey Noble, a former officer from Irvine,
California, to review the case. He likewise concluded that the use of force was
unreasonable and likewise described an extremely hostile reception from the
prosecutors.141 He notably stated, “I’ve never had to fight so hard to defend myself
in the midst of a presentation,” and “I’ve definitely never seen two prosecutors play
defense attorney so well.”142
The Rice family lawyers hired a third expert, Jesse Wobrack, a biomechanics
expert, who gave a similar account of his hostile reception by the prosecutors in the
grand jury.143
These claims should be taken with a grain of salt as they are given by experts
hired by the Tamir Rice family. Moreover, the prosecutors cannot respond to these
claims because they are prohibited from doing so by grand jury secrecy rules. 144
Nonetheless, these three similar accounts provide some of the limited evidence
available about what occurred in this grand jury proceeding.
Had a grand jury victim advocate been participating in the grand jury, that lawyer
could have presented these expert witnesses and allowed them to give their views.
Prosecutors likely would have given them the same hostile reception, but strong
arguments from the victim advocate would have countered such a one-sided view.
Moreover, it is reasonable to infer from the facts above that the prosecution’s
own expert witnesses—who concluded that the shooting was justified—were not
subjected to any probing cross-examination or serious questioning of their
conclusions. Again, had a victim advocate been present, these experts would have
been vigorously cross-examined—as to their qualifications, their past work, and their
reasoning and conclusions in the Tamir Rice shooting.
Overall, the limited information that has been revealed about the Tamir Rice
grand jury presentation conveys the strong impression that prosecutors came to the
conclusion that the shooting was justified and then vigorously and zealously
advocated for that conclusion before the grand jury. A victim advocate would have
vigorously and zealously advocated to the contrary—that the shooting was
unjustified.
It is impossible to say what the outcome would have been in that scenario and
whether any indictments would have been returned. But with an advocate
representing the interests of the Tamir Rice family, the grand jury would have had
the opportunity to operate more independently. The grand jury would not have found
itself entirely reliant on the prosecution to hear the witnesses and the evidence. It
would have been exposed to a contrary point of view—an advocate who would have
been eager to help the grand jury track down any evidence or witnesses that might
support charges.

140

Id. (emphasis in original).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E) (2017).
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It is hard to imagine how a grand jury of untrained laypersons, without access to
their own resources or legal expertise, could serve as much more than a rubber stamp
to a determined prosecutor in a case like the Tamir Rice shooting. A grand jury
victim advocate would be an important step toward empowering the grand jury to act
as an independent deliberative body. That independent body could then act not only
to screen out unwarranted prosecutions, but also to assess whether prosecution of a
government official (the police officers) might indeed be warranted even though
another government official (the prosecutor) has concluded otherwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Grand juries have long been criticized for their lack of independence and
overreliance on prosecutors. In several recent high-profile cases involving police use
of deadly force, prosecutors have presented evidence to the grand jury but advocated
strongly against any criminal charges—and grand juries have followed the
prosecutor’s guidance.
An independent grand jury, freed from prosecutorial dominance, could serve as
an important democratic check on police misconduct. This role was common
throughout American history—independent grand juries brought charges against
government officials engaged in wrongdoing even when local prosecutors were
reluctant to bring charges or were complicit in the corruption.
Authorizing the alleged victim of police excessive force to be represented before
the grand jury would ensure that the grand jury in police cases hears from a
representative whose interests are aligned with the complainant rather than the
police. The grand jury victim advocate would therefore (1) help the grand jury to
speak again as the voice of the community, (2) help to rediscover and reclaim the
tradition of grand jury independence, and (3) provide democratic oversight in cases
of alleged police misconduct.
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